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Provincialization and Deprovincialization 
Education is a prime terrain for the transmission, facilitation, 
development and production of knowledge. This is a truism 
bordering on platitude. Universities, in particular, are literally 
defined in terms of the generation of knowledge. Given the 
intimate relationship between education and educational 
institutions, on the one hand, and epistemology and 
knowledge, on the other, it should come as no surprise that 
the decolonization discourses around provincialization of 
(Western) education should have come to include talk of 
provincialization of (Western) epistemology. My aim in this 
short contribution is to interrogate assertions regarding the 
‘(de)provincialization’ and/or ‘(de)colonization’ of 
knowledge and epistemology in education and educational 
research and to investigate whether the postcolonial ideas of 
diverse and local epistemologies do not involve a mistaken 
sense of ‘epistemology’. I argue for an applied epistemology 
for the real world: that there are good reasons for an 
unequivocal and context-sensitive (albeit not context-
relative) understanding of knowledge and epistemology in 
education and educational research – and for being able to 
distinguish between knowledge and non-knowledge. 
Geographic, ethnic, racial and gender-based differences do 
not constitute relevant criteria for any such demarcation. 
Instances in which they are cited as criteria raise questions 
not of epistemological relevance but rather of social justice. 
Provincialization has been conceptually associated with 
“decentering” (Hindi: प्रा�ीयकरण; Urdu: یئابوص انانب; see 
Chakrabarty, 2000, pp. 3-4) and with “desuperiorization” 
(Freter, 2020): to ‘provincialize the West’ is fundamentally 
to ‘de-Westernize’ the world. What is behind calls for the 
provincialization of Europe (Chakrabarty, 2000; 
Mackenthun, 2016; Mbembe, n.d.; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018, 
p. 3)? And what exactly is it about Europe that must be 
decentered (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018, p. 4) or shifted from the 
center? The reasons why such calls are made are, from a 
social justice perspective, clear and plausible. Europe 
certainly has a lot to answer for. Following centuries of brutal 
colonial and other hegemonic marginalization, denigration, 
oppression and exploitation, the purpose is to challenge the 
arrogance, hegemony and alleged supremacy of ‘Europe’ or 
the ‘Western tradition’ (see Enslin & Horsthemke, 2015). 
The countervailing move emphasizes reclamation, restitution 
of dignity and value, re-cognition and protection (Le Grange, 
2016, pp. 3-4). Regarding the second question, amongst other 
things it is Western educational and epistemological 
hegemony (Amir-Moazami & Streicher, n.d.; Streicher & 
Amir-Moazami. n.d.) and interpretational sovereignty that 
are denied pride of place and that are seen alongside other 
modes and systems of education, knowledge and 
interpretation. 
The provincialization of Europe (Chakrabarty, 2004) and 
Western education has not only been linked with 
decolonization (Freter, 2020) but is in turn seen as a process 
also involving the deprovincialization, (re)centering/moving 
to the center or globalization, of, for example, Africa, of 
African education (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018), and of 
indigenous epistemologies and knowledges (Ahenakew et 
al., 2014, p. 228), generally. Thus, provincialization of 
education, of epistemologies (Amir-Moazami & Streicher. 
n.d.) and of knowledge (Ahenakew et al., 2014, p. 228) is 
understood to involve democratization of education and 
knowledge (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018, p. 81), epistemological 
decolonization (Mbembe, n.d., pp. 2, 10; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2018, p. 3) and Africanization of knowledge (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2018, p. 81). But what exactly do epistemological 
democratization and decolonization and Africanization of 
knowledge involve? And what is it about so-called ‘Western’ 
or ‘Eurocentric’ education, epistemology and knowledge that 
must be decentered or shifted from the center (Le Grange 
2016, p. 10; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018, p. 80)? The most 
plausible response is that knowledge that had been 
‘colonized’, appropriated, dis-owned and/or suppressed is 
now being reclaimed, re-appropriated, repossessed. In this 
process, the view that is vilified is the following (and here we 
notice a move from social justice to epistemology): 
achievement of reliable knowledge through objective, 
dispassionate inquiry can occur only when knowers are 
understood as separate from the objects of knowledge, and 
operate freely from subjective distortion and from the 
influence of society or culture. The maligned universalist 
view holds that this constitutes the pathway to truth, a 
universal method leading to a universal, value-neutral system 
of knowledge about life, the universe and (just about) 
everything. Knowledge not only renders possible prediction 
of how nature will behave, but it also yields the power to 
impose order on it and control it. By contrast, advocates of 
(de)provincialization emphasize ecologies of knowledge 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018, p. 81), the demand for cognitive 
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justice (see Le Grange, 2016, p. 4; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018, 
p. 4) and condemnation of epistemic injustice, epistemic 
diversity (Mbembe, n.d., p. 19), different/diverse 
epistemologies (Andreotti et al., 2011, p. 40) or 
epistemological pluralism (Andreotti et al., 2012, p. 236), 
indigenous knowledge (systems) (Ahenakew et al., 2014, p. 
220; Le Grange, 2016, p. 3), and alternative ways of knowing 
(Mackenthun, 2016). Key tenets are the following (see Hall 
& Tandon, 2017, p. 6):  
● The concepts of cognitive justice and democratization of 
knowledge acknowledge the significance of diverse 
epistemologies and organic, spiritual and land-based 
knowledge systems, epistemological frameworks arising 
from social movements and the knowledge of the 
marginalized or excluded. They are about both institutional 
and epistemological access, making the sharing of 
knowledge a powerful tool in the struggle to deepen 
democracy and for a healthier and more just world.  
● Higher education institutions today exclude many of the 
diverse knowledge systems in the world, such as those of 
indigenous peoples and marginalized ethnic and racial 
groups, and those marginalized because of gender and sexual 
orientation.  
● Such exclusion often involves “epistemicide” (see also De 
Sousa Santos, 2014; Le Grange, 2016), which refers to the 
killing of knowledge systems, of “indigenous people’s 
knowledges” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018, p. 3). 
‘Epistemicide’ and ‘Cognitive Justice’ 
One of the major problems with (de)provincialization and 
decolonization discourses is that the ideas of epistemology 
and knowledge characteristically remain undefined, thus 
allowing advocates to use them in a variety of tendentious 
and even sloganeering ways. ‘Epistemology’ is a domain or 
division within philosophy that investigates the nature, origin 
and conditions of knowledge. It further means ‘theory of 
knowledge’, i.e. theory of the nature, origins and conditions 
of knowledge. Thus, the very least one would expect from 
advocates is a theory of the nature of knowledge – including 
articulation of the concept of knowledge they are working 
with. If knowledge is understood in the epistemologically 
relevant sense as adequately justified true belief, then what is 
there to be said about ideas like epistemicide, 
epistemological diversity or pluralism, and epistemic or 
cognitive (in)justice? 
‘Epistemicide’ is a notion that has achieved widespread 
articulation and less-than-critical support. Thus, there is a 
tendency to apply it in a rather undifferentiated manner to all 
kinds of beliefs – irrespective of whether they amount to 
knowledge. Does rejection of views underlying rainmaking 
and ancestor agency amount to the ‘killing of knowledge 
systems’? Is the failure to allow flat-earth and geocentric 
worldviews in geography classrooms a matter of 
epistemicide? What about the refusal to teach creationism in 
biology? Or the unwillingness to allow the counsel of active 
drug dealers in career guidance sessions? Similar 
considerations pertain to the ideas of cognitive justice and 
epistemic injustice. Surely there is a difference between 
rejecting someone’s knowledge-claims on the mere grounds 
that she is black or a woman (this would be both ethically 
reprehensible and epistemologically problematic), and 
rejecting the claims held or expressed by someone who 
happens to be black or a woman, because they are unjustified 
and/or false, or because they result from faulty or fallacious 
reasoning. Nonsense is not geographically, ethnically, 
culturally, racially or sexually locatable or specific. 
A further problem concerns “nativism and ghettoization 
of knowledge” (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018, p. 81), which is 
likely to isolate particular ‘epistemologies’ and 
‘knowledges’, thus rendering them powerless and irrelevant 
beyond their immediate sphere of application. On the other 
hand, the problem with equating centering and globalizing 
(of, for example, “knowledge from Africa”; p. 4) is that, in 
order to avoid a new kind of hegemony (e.g. Afrocentrism 
replacing Eurocentrism), all indigenous epistemologies and 
knowledge systems are ‘centered’, in which case they are all 
considered equally respectable and valid, valuable and 
immune from critical interrogation. 
There is also a confusion that characterizes Lesley Le 
Grange and Glen Aikenhead’s concern (2017, p. 32), which 
“has been (and is) with critiquing the dominance of 
Eurocentric sciences, arguing that its dominance is not 
because of its purported superior rationality, but because of 
European imperialism and colonialism – that its hegemony 
as well as its appearance of universal truth and rationality are 
primarily the outcome of military, economic and political 
power of European cultures”. But can one actually speak of 
“Eurocentric sciences”? Either the criteria for being a science 
are met, i.e.  necessarily involving reference to laws or 
regularities, observation, description, explanation, prediction 
and testable hypothesis, or they are not. The authors appear 
to be committing a category mistake, by conflating matters 
of epistemology and matters of social justice. 
‘Diverse Epistemologies’ and ‘Ecology of 
Knowledges’ 
In their defence of what they call the “ecology of 
knowledges“ Boaventura de Sousa Santos, João Arriscado 
Nunes and Maria Paula Meneses, too, speak of the 
“immense” “epistemological diversity of the world“ (De 
Sousa Santos et al., 2008, pp. xix; xlviii). However, on the 
basis of the premise that “there is no global social justice 
without global cognitive justice“ (p. xix; see also Andreotti, 
2011, p. 381), they relate this appeal not to different 
normative theories of knowledge, but rather to diversity 
across ethnicities and cultures, as well as to gender 
differences (De Sousa Santos et al., 2008, p. xix). 
Beginning with the assumption that “cultural diversity 
and epistemological diversity are reciprocally embedded”, 
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the authors’ intention is to show that “the reinvention of 
social emancipation is premised upon replacing the 
‘monoculture of scientific knowledge‘ by an ‘ecology of 
knowledges‘“. In other words, “far from refusing science”, 
the “alternative epistemology“ envisaged here “places the 
latter in the context of diversity of knowledges existing in 
contemporary societies“ (p. xx).  
This exemplifies the recent but widespread view that 
ethnic or cultural groups have their own distinctive 
epistemologies, that epistemologies are also gendered, and 
that these have been largely ignored by the dominant social 
group. A corollary of this view states that educational 
research is pursued within a framework that represents 
assumptions about knowledge and knowledge production 
that reflect the interests and historical traditions of this 
dominant group. Thus, many theorists emphasize 
decolonization of knowledge, recognition of indigenous, 
local or subaltern knowledge systems and “radically 
different” epistemologies within a reconceptualized 
education. Other popular, related ideas are “local, cultural 
ways of knowing” and “non-Western” or “alternative 
epistemologies” (Andreotti, 2011, p. 385). Thus, “the works 
of Le Grange and Aikenhead have been essentially concerned 
with critiquing the marginalization, denigration and 
decimation of indigenous knowledges” (Le Grange & 
Aikenhead, 2017, p. 32). The authors assume, without 
providing any argument, that the notion of “indigenous 
knowledges” is a meaningful one. 
More often than not, in such arguments for different, 
diverse, alternative, decolonized or demasculinized 
epistemologies some relevant philosophical issues remain 
unresolved, if not unaddressed altogether. What exactly do 
these claims about epistemological diversity mean? Do these 
ways of establishing knowledge stand up to critical 
interrogation? Moreover, how do they relate to traditional 
epistemological distinctions, e.g. between knowledge and 
belief and between descriptive and normative inquiry, and to 
epistemologically essential components like justification, 
evidence, warrant, and truth? 
The Value of Diversity within Education and 
Epistemology  
Emily Robertson (2013, p. 300) argues that diversity is 
both an epistemic and a moral virtue, but that this argument 
“does not support alternative epistemologies, cognitive 
relativism, or the replacement of truth as an epistemic goal 
by, for example, beliefs that have progressive consequences“. 
The value of diversity for knowledge resides in the 
possibility of different groups having “different experiences 
that lead them to know or believe things that escape others’ 
attention“: reports of their experiences may function as data 
that allows researchers to examine the social system or 
structure from their social location (p. 304).  
While postcolonial theory arguably errs in postulating the 
existence of diverse knowledges and truths, the diversity in 
question is conceivably generated by (characteristically) 
practical epistemic priorities – priorities that emanate from 
different lived experiences, individual as well as social and 
cultural. A plausible view appears to be that knowledge and 
truth do not fluctuate, that they remain invariant across 
individuals, societies and cultures, but that there may well be 
distinctive sets of epistemic concerns that arise from 
personal, historical and socio-political circumstances. If it is 
correct to assume that practical epistemic and educational 
priorities will emerge from life experiences and from the 
ways these are socially articulated, then one might assume 
that, given the different life experiences of people across the 
globe, the practical epistemic and educational priorities will 
also differ. 
For example, as Elizabeth Anderson (2002, p. 325) has 
put it: 
No one disputes that personal knowledge of what it is 
like to be pregnant, undergo childbirth, suffer 
menstrual cramps, and have other experiences of a 
female body is specific to women. Gynaecology has 
certainly progressed since women entered the field and 
have brought their personal knowledge to bear on 
misogynist medical practices. The claims get more 
controversial the more global they are in scope. Some 
people claim that women have gender-typical ‘ways of 
knowing’, styles of thinking, methodologies, and 
ontologies that globally govern or characterize their 
cognitive activities across all subject matters. For 
instance, various feminist epistemologists have claimed 
that women think more intuitively and contextually, 
concern themselves more with particulars than with 
abstractions, emotionally engage themselves more with 
individual subjects of study, and frame their thoughts 
in relational rather than an atomistic ontology … There 
is little persuasive evidence for such global claims. 
(Anderson, 2002, p. 325) 
Interestingly, too, Anderson “does not suppose that 
women theorists bring some shared feminine difference to all 
subjects of knowledge” (p. 326). 
Given, to take a further example, the experience of 
‘indigenous’ Africans of wide-ranging cognitive injustice, it 
stands to reason that they would have as priorities matters of 
epistemic transformation and redress. If epistemic and 
educational concerns and priorities arise from different forms 
of social life, then those that have emerged from a social 
system in which a particular race or group has been 
subordinate to another deserve special scrutiny. Given the 
(especially vicious) history of physical and psychological 
colonization, it is plausible that one of the epistemic and 
educational priorities will be to educate against development 
of a subordinate or inferior mindset, as well as against a 
victim and beggar mentality, despite the continuing 
economic crisis and low level of economic growth. While it 
does not follow that particular historical and socio-economic 
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circumstances yield or bestow automatic validation or 
justification of (the content and objectives of) an ‘African 
epistemology’, an idea like ‘decolonization of African 
minds’ has a particular resonance here. Rather than implying 
a ‘post-truth’ epistemology, it involves Africa’s 
contributions to (world) knowledge. 
If what has been established above is cogent, it follows 
that so-called ‘(de)provincialization’ and ‘diverse 
epistemologies’ refer neither to a multitude of truths nor to 
an ‘anything goes’ conception of justification, but rather to 
different experiences connected to particular social locations, 
or – as Robertson puts it – to different social pathways to 
knowledge (note the singular!). In this sense, reference to 
‘epistemologies’ – like reference to “plural systems of 
knowledges” (De Sousa Santos et al., 2008, p. xxxix) or to 
indigenous, local or subaltern ways of knowing – is not only 
unhelpful but also misleading. 
The promise of an applied epistemology for the real 
world, then, has in part to do with locality and context-
specific relations – but not in terms of any exclusionist, 
‘hands-off’ approach. Rather, it appears to be plausible that 
the particular historical, geographic and socio-cultural 
experiences of people give rise to particular priorities that 
shape their epistemic theory and practice – and also yield 
conceptual and epistemological tools that are likely to enrich 
education and educational research as a whole. 
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